We conduct an experimental analysis of pretrial bargaining, while allowing for the costly voluntary disclosure of private information in a screening game. In this game, the theoretical prediction is that costly voluntary disclosures will not occur. This hinges on the prediction that the person making the offer will extract all the joint surplus of settlement from the player making the costly disclosure. If concerns about fairness or reciprocity prevent this from occurring, then we may observe costly disclosures when none are predicted to occur. Our chief finding is that plaintiffs with a strong case reveal their private information 42% percent of the time, when the theoretical prediction is that they should do so 0% of the time. For a plaintiff with a strong case, the return to revealing private information is either zero or slightly negative.
Introduction
It is well known that asymmetric information can lead to costly disputes such as trials, strikes and wars. Institutions which facilitate the transfer of information between disputants have the potential to reduce the incidence of these disputes. One such institution, which is quite simple, is the voluntary disclosure of private information. While it might appear that individuals with favorable information would have an incentive to reveal it, the theoretical literature on pretrial bargaining predicts that the information structure of the game determines whether costly disclosures will be made. In particular, costly voluntary disclosures may be made when the informed party makes the final offer prior to trial (i.e., in the signaling model), but are predicted never to occur when the uninformed party makes this offer (i.e., in the screening model).
In this paper, we conduct an experimental analysis of pretrial bargaining, while allowing for the costly disclosure of private information in a screening game. In this game, the theoretical prediction is that costly voluntary disclosures will not occur. However, this theoretical prediction is derived assuming the player making the offer can extract all of the joint surplus from settlement. We know from the literature on ultimatum games, that fairness may play an important role in bargaining. There is also a literature on reciprocity which suggests that a player undertaking a costly revelation of private information to the benefit of her bargaining partner may be rewarded via a more generous offer than is predicted by the standard theory. To the extent that fairness or reciprocity behaviors are exhibited in our game, the predictions of the standard theory may not hold in our setting. Our experiment sheds important light on this question.
We find that 42% of plaintiffs with a strong case reveal their private information, while only 16% of plaintiffs with a weak case do the same; in the second half of the experiment the proportions are 38% and 13%, respectively. This contrasts with the theoretical prediction that 0% of both types will reveal their information. Pecorino and Van Boening (2004) find that 80% of plaintiffs with a strong case reveal their private information when doing so is costless. Thus, introducing costly disclosure of private information leads to a dramatic drop in the extent to which players choose to do so. When plaintiffs with a strong case reveal their private information, the dispute rate drops by an average of 62-percentage points, from about 97% to about 35%. Players with weak cases who reveal their information experience no systematic effect: excess disputes average about 20-25% when these plaintiffs remain silent, and disputes rates sometimes increase and sometimes decrease when they reveal.
The data provide some support for the theory, but also contain some important anomalies which we discuss in more detail below. We view this paper first pass at gaining a better understanding of the role of costly voluntary disclosures in the litigation process. It is important to gain this understanding, because it may help to shed light on how to better structure bargaining prior to a dispute and on whether costly institutions, such as discovery, are necessary elements of the litigation process.
Background
There is an extensive experimental literature in law and economics, but the work on litigation and arbitration has most often been in a setting where both parties to the dispute have the same information regarding the expected value of the suit at trial.
1 An exception to this is work testing the Priest and Klein (1984) model (e.g., Stanley and Coursey 1990) in which both parties have private information. 2 Previous work by Van Boening (2004, 2012b) has analyzed screening models of litigation. The most directly related previous work is Pecorino and Van Boening (2004) . Their setting is a screening model in which the plaintiff can costlessly reveal her type. Under the standard theory, such a plaintiff would be technically indifferent between revealing and not revealing her private information. They find that 80% of plaintiffs with a strong case reveal their private information. In the later rounds of their experiment, plaintiffs who reveal their private information experience a 52-percentage point decline in their dispute rate relative to a baseline under which voluntary disclosures cannot occur.
In the current paper, we introduce a cost of voluntary disclosure which is equal to 1/6 of the joint surplus which is saved when a dispute is avoided. Under the standard theory, this gives the plaintiff a strict incentive not to reveal her private information. However, we know from the ultimatum game literature that the player with the power to make a take-it-or-leave it offer cannot generally extract all of the joint surplus from settlement. 3 Moreover, when a plaintiff with a strong case reveals her private information in our experiment, she is taking a costly action which could save her bargaining partner the cost of a dispute, as such disputes are predicted to occur with such plaintiffs in the absence of information transmission. Thus, the players might look on the costly revelation of private information as a form of gift exchange. In this case, the player in the role of the defendant might reward strong plaintiffs who reveal their type by making an offer which at least compensates for the cost of information disclosure. 2 Most of the experiments of Inglis et al. (2005) are conducted with symmetric information, but in one of their treatments both parties have private information. 3 The ultimatum game literature is quite large. See, among others, Slonim and Roth (1998), Falk et al. (2003) , Schmidt (2004) and Andreoni and Blanchard (2006) . 4 There is an extensive experimental literature showing that experimental subjects will engage in acts of reciprocity. Thus, if player A undertakes a costly action to raise player B's payoff, player B will often responds by taking a costly action to raise A's payoff. Among others, see Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) and Cox (2012) . Also see the theoretical contribution of Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2008) . Because it is costless to reveal private information, Our model of litigation is a simplified version of Bebchuk (1984) . He develops a screening model in which an uninformed defendant makes an offer to an informed plaintiff. Shavell (1989) analyzes costless and credible voluntary disclosure in the screening model and finds that it leads to a 100% rate of settlement. Sobel (1989) shows that these results are not robust in the sense that even small costs of disclosure will prevent its occurrence in this model.
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This occurs because the party making the offer extracts all of the surplus of settlement from the party receiving the offer. This leaves the party receiving the offer with the same payoff she would receive in the event of a dispute. If she incurs the disclosure cost of revealing her private information, she will receive her dispute payoff minus the disclosure cost. While this result is interesting, it hinges on the assumption that the person making the offer can extract all of the joint surplus from settlement. We know from the ultimatum game literature that individuals generally cannot extract all of the joint surplus from settlement. Experimental analysis of litigation settings appears to indicate a much smaller role for fairness than is observed in the ultimatum game settling. For example, Pecorino and Van Boening (2012b) find for a screening model that only 20-25% of the joint surplus from settlement is contained in the typical offer. 6 By contrast, in the typical ultimatum game, 40-45% of the joint surplus from settlement is contained in the average offer. While less fairness behavior is exhibited in the litigation setting compared with a simple ultimatum game, fairness still plays some role. In our experiment, the cost of revealing private information is 1/6 of the joint surplus from settlement. If plaintiffs with a strong case are able to obtain as much as 20-25% of the joint surplus from settlement, they will have a Pecorino and Van Boening (2004) does not provide a setting in which the players can engage in acts of reciprocity as defined above. 5 If the costs of revealing private information are sufficiently small, voluntary disclosures will be made in the signaling game (Farmer and Pecorino 2005) . 6 Pecorino and Van Boening (2010) analyze a litigation model with symmetric information and find that the median offer only contains 8% of the joint surplus from settlement.
positive incentive to reveal their private information, even though this is not predicted by the standard theory.
There is an element present in the current experiment which is not present in the work cited above. The players in this experiment have an opportunity to engage in a gift exchange.
When a plaintiff with a strong case reveals her type, she is potentially saving her bargaining partner $1.50, because a dispute is otherwise predicted to occur. In the process, she incurs a cost of $.25. This could potentially lead to reciprocity whereby her bargaining partner rewards her behavior by offering at least as much surplus as is required to compensate for the costs of information revelation. As described below, the standard theory predicts the defendant will use the information to avoid the cost of trial, while still attempting to extract all of the joint surplus from settlement.
Of course, it is not clear a priori whether or not we will observe a sufficient degree of fairness behaviors or reciprocity to overturn the theoretical prediction that under this information structure, the strong plaintiff will not engage in a costly disclosure of private information. This underscores the value of an experiment addressing this question. Furthermore, the discussion above does not apply to a plaintiff with a weak case. In the absence of information transmission, the defendant is predicted to make a sorting offer designed to be acceptable to a weak plaintiff, but not to a strong plaintiff. If fairness is a concern, this sorting offer will offer the weak plaintiff some of the surplus from settlement. (This behavior has been observed in previous experiments.)
There is no scope for reciprocity in this case, because disputes are not predicted to occur with weak plaintiffs in any event. Thus, to the extent the fairness or reciprocity cause a deviation from the theory we should expect it to occur from the plaintiff with a strong case. These factors do not overturn the theoretical conclusion that weak plaintiffs should remain silent.
Theory
In this section, we will present a simple screening game based on Bebchuk (1984) . We will describe the game without voluntary disclosure in some detail, so as to make the baseline of the experiment clear. We will then draw on the results of the literature for our predictions about costly voluntary disclosure.
Both the plaintiff and defendant are risk neutral. The level of damages to be awarded at trial is known by the plaintiff but not the defendant. The defendant only knows that with probability q he faces a high damage plaintiff J H and with probability 1-q he faces a low damages plaintiff J L . In all of our analyses, the probability p that the plaintiff prevails at trial is common knowledge, and we furthermore assume that p = 1. The plaintiff is one of two types, type H with a strong case or type L with a weak case. At trial, the plaintiff receives judgment
When the case proceeds to trial, the plaintiff incurs the cost C P and the defendant incurs the cost C D . We assume that J L ! C P > 0 , so that even the weak plaintiff type has a positive expected value suit.
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The stages of the game are as follows:
0. Nature determines the plaintiff's type to be either H with judgment J H or L with judgment J L . The plaintiff is type H with probability q and type L with probability 1-q.
The plaintiff knows her type, but the defendant knows only the probability q that the plaintiff is type H (and hence the probability 1-q that the plaintiff is type L). 
The defendant will either choose a low screening offer that only a type L plaintiff will accept or a high pooling offer O D H that both plaintiff types will accept. The defendant offers O D L iff.
(
A low screening offer will be made by the defendant if the probability q of encountering a type H plaintiff is sufficiently small. When a screening offer is made, a trial will occur whenever a type H plaintiff is encountered. Thus, trials occur with probability q. The defendant will make a pooling offer if the condition in (2) the ultimatum game and on reciprocity call into question the idea that the player making the final offer will extract all of the joint surplus from settlement. Thus, it is an interesting empirical question as to whether this prediction of the model will be borne out. If no disclosures are made, the predictions for the model are exactly the same as in the game where disclosure is not an option.
A fully specified player strategy includes actions at nodes that are not reached in the equilibrium of the game. Disclosure is off the equilibrium path of the game, but if a type L plaintiff should disclose, the subgame perfect response by the defendant is to offer
8 Under our experimental parameters, the expected cost of a screening offer is $2.25, and the expected cost of a pooling offer is $3.75. Over thirteen rounds, the player engaged in the screening strategy would expect to pay out $19.50 less over the course of the experiment. 9 Our theoretical predictions are largely robust to the introduction of risk aversion on the part of either player. The plaintiff knows the outcome of trial with certainty. Thus the minimum acceptable offer for type L and type H plaintiffs will not change if the plaintiff is risk averse. This implies that the screening offer made by the defendant will not change if the plaintiff is risk averse. It is possible that a risk averse defendant will make a pooling offer when a screening offer is predicted under risk neutrality. A pooling offer avoids the probability q risk that the defendant will incur the cost J H + C D . Empirically we observe relatively few pooling offers.
Similarly, if a type H plaintiff does reveal, the subgame perfect response by the defendant is to
In each case, it is predicted that the offer will be accepted by the plaintiff.
Design and Predictions
In this section, we will first discuss the experimental design and we then present the corresponding theoretical predictions. Table 1 summarizes the ten sessions in our experimental design. In five sessions B1-B5, subjects played the baseline screening game and in five sessions T1-T5, they played the treatment. In the treatment sessions, the player in the role of the plaintiff is given the opportunity to make a costly voluntary disclosure prior to receiving an offer. Subjects were recruited from business classes at
Experimental Design
The University of Alabama. The number of bargaining pairs ranges from 5 -8, and each session lasts 12 to 14 rounds.
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Type L plaintiffs are denoted by A L and type H plaintiffs by A H . The player in the role of the defendant is referred to as player B. The A and B players were randomly and anonymously paired every round. The subjects were not told ahead of time how many rounds the experiment would last. Including the instructional period and the private payment at the end, each session lasted two hours or less. The mean and median earnings for our subjects were about $30 with a minimum of $15 and a maximum of $46. All earning were from decision-making, as the subjects were not paid a show-up fee.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two rooms, with one experimenter assigned to each of the two rooms. Subjects were not initially informed of their role. The subjects received common instructions that explained in detail how the experiment would be conducted. The instructions included practice rounds which illustrated the steps in a round and showed how payoffs and costs would be determined. 11 After the instructions were read, subjects in one room were informed that they were player A and subjects in the other room were informed that they were player B. Subjects maintained the same role throughout the experiment. The only interaction between the A and B players consisted of written messages transmitted by experimenters between the two rooms. 12 The subjects wrote their decisions on their private
Record Sheet, which the experimenters then recorded on their own form. After all subjects had made their decisions, the experimenters met between the two rooms, silently copied information from one another's forms, and then returned to the rooms and wrote the results on the respective subject's Record Sheet.
The following parameters are used in the experiment. The "judgments" at trial are J L = $1.50 for A L players and J H = $4.50 for A H players, where the probability that a plaintiff is A H is q = 1/3. The costs of a trial are C P = C D = $.75, so that the total cost of a dispute is $1.50. When voluntary disclosure is an option, the cost is v = $.25. In the experiment, terminology such as plaintiff, defendant, judgment at trial, court costs, etc. was not used.
In the experiment, the payoffs and costs were presented to the subjects in pennies, so that $4.50 is written as 450 and so on. This same convention is used in what follows. The sequence in a round in the screening game is given below. This description of a round is very similar to the description appearing in the subjects' instruction. Step 3 applies only in the voluntary disclosure treatment. Player A's payoff from the experiment is the sum of her payoffs from all rounds. Player B's payoff from the experiment is lump sum minus the sum of his costs from all rounds; the lump sum is known in advance by player B but is never revealed to player A. When the message N is sent, the predictions for the rest of the game correspond to P1-P3 above.
That is, conditional on P4 and P5, we have the following prediction:
P6. Conditional on both player A types sending message N, the outcomes in the treatment will mirror those in the baseline.
The situation in which the plaintiff reveals her type occurs off the equilibrium path of the game, 14 For the purposes of exposition, we will ignore (here and elsewhere) the extra penny of surplus that might be needed to ensure settlement under the predictions of the fully rational model. If fairness plays a role, then the surplus needed to ensure settlement may to be substantially more than one penny. 
P8. When plaintiff

Results
Our discussion of the results is organized around predictions P1-P8. In the tables below, we present data for all rounds of each session. In addition, we selectively provide information for rounds 7 to the end of the session (denoted R7-End) when there is a notable difference in behavior over the last half of the experiment.
The Baseline 15
Our first result is in regards to Player B's offers:
R1. Eighty-seven percent of all player B's offers are screening offers, 92% in rounds 7-End.
B's screening offers typically exceed the P1 prediction = 75, but his behavior is largely consistent with the theory as he makes offers designed to screen the two player A types. From the perspective of A L , B's average screening offers contain 2/7 or less of the surplus from settlement, while his median screening offers contain 1/6 or less. Table 2 presents summary data on player B's offers. In sessions B2-B5, 86% to 95% of the offers fall in the screening interval 75-225. Session B1 has the lowest occurrence, but the preponderance is still screening offers (75% all rounds, 83% R7-End). From player A L 's perspective, an offer of 100 translates into 1/6 of the surplus from settlement, 112 into 1/4, and 125 into 1/3. The mean screening offers range from 97.2 to 118.1; these represent, respectively, 15% (or about 1/7) to 29% (about 2/7) of the surplus from settlement. In B1-B4, the median screening offers are 100, i.e., 17% or 1/6 of the surplus, and in B5 the median is 80 or 3% of the surplus. Further analysis of the data reveals that within each session, half to over three quarters of B's screening offers contain 1/6 or less of the surplus and about three quarters contain 1/3 or 15 The baseline experiments in this paper are also utilized in Pecorino and Van Boening (2012a In B1, three players B made the ten Between offers, with two making four each. In B3, three players B made the eight Between offers, with one making five. In B5, one player B made three of the four Between offers. b In B1, one player B made six of the eleven Pooling offers and another made four. In B2, one player B made two of the three Pooling offers. In B3, one player B made two of the four Pooling offers. In B4, one player B made both Pooling offers. c Six of these seven offers are < 75. In B3, one player B made one offer < 75 and the offer > 525. 16 The percentages of screening offers that are 75-100 are B1 63.4%, B2 56.7%, B3 51.6%, B4 64.5%, and B5 78.9%; the percentages that are 75-125 are B1 73.0%, B2 78.3%, B3 82.0%, B4 77.4%, and B5 88.1%. 17 From Table 2 , 6% of B's offers are 226-374, i.e., between the screening and pooling ranges. A "Between" offer is a very poor one from B's perspective: it offers A L more than 100% of the surplus, but it is still below A H 's dispute payoff of 375. We do not have a parsimonious explanation for this behavior, though we note that it falls to 3% in R7-End. Also, 2% of B's offers are either < 75 or > 525, but 0% in R7-End. Similar behavior occurs in the treatment. The notes to Tables 2 and 6 provide more detail on offers outside the screening range. The player B and player A behavior in the baseline serves as the benchmark for the behavior in the treatment when player A sends message N and does not inform B as to her type.
Our second result is in regards to
The main baseline results are that B tends to offer around 1/6-1/3 of the surplus from A L 's perspective, A L will sometimes reject screening offers with 1/6 or less of the surplus, and the A H behavior conforms quite closely to the theoretical predictions.
Does A reveal her type in the Treatment?
Predictions P4 and P5 stipulate that players A L and A H will only send messages N, i.e., no costly disclosure will occur in the treatment and the outcomes will mirror those in the baseline. type A H ; the numbers decline in rounds 7-End, but they are still about the same (11 and 12, respectively). 21 We comment below on the ex post returns to both A L and A H from costly disclosure (i.e., sending message Y) in this experiment. Prediction P6 stipulates that conditional on message N being sent by player A, the treatment will mirror the baseline. Results R6.A -R6.C find that when player A does in fact send message N, the data support P6. Result R6.A summarizes B's behavior: R6.A. Upon receiving message N, 85% (219/257) of player B's offers are screening offers and his typical screening offer is about 100-120. From the perspective of type A L , B's typical offer contains about 1/6-2/7 of the surplus from settlement. This is essentially the same as the baseline result R1. Tables 2 and 6 are very similar, and we do not find any statistical difference. In T1, five players B made the nine Between offers, with two making three each and one making two. In T3, two players B made two Between offers each. In T4, one player B made two of the four Between offers. In T5, one player B made two of the four Between offers. b In T1, two players B made two Pooling offers each. In T4, one player B made three of the five Pooling offers, all in rounds R7-End. Table 7 provides results analogous to those in Table 3 . The data in Tables 3 and 7 are quite similar; and when comparing them we find no statistical difference. 23 The one notable exception is session T5, as there the dispute rate on offers 75-99 is 63% (17/27) overall and 69% (11/16) R7-End. This is somewhat unique amongst dispute rates over small amounts of surplus both for In the baseline, the A H behavior conforms quite closely to the theoretical predictions. In the treatment, the behavior of the silent A H -N is no different: R6.C. Player A H -N rejects 98% (64/65) of the offers less than 375, and she accepts the one offer greater than or equal to 375. These results are virtually identical to those in baseline result R3. Table 8 provides summary data similar to those in Table 5 . We find no statistical difference between the dispute rates shown in Tables 5 and 8 Tables 2 and 6 . With the exception of four offers in the early rounds (see Table 9 note), player B always makes screening offers to A L -Y. As there are limited observations per session, we focus on median offers, although our substantive claims hold for mean offers as well. Overall, B's offers are similar to those made in response to message N, and as a result, it is unprofitable for A L to reveal her type. Compared to the median screening offer B makes in response to message N (Table 6) , only in session T1 does B increase his median offer by an amount equal to v = 25, from 100 to 125. In T2, the median increases, but only from 100 to 114. In the other three sessions, the Table 9 median is less than the Table 6 median (differences of -27.5 in T3, -7.5 in T4, and -14.0 in T5). 25 Recall that the players are randomly and anonymously paired each round. Thus, the players are not in a repeated game relationship. Table 12 shows that A H -Y rejects 67% (6/9) of the pooling offers less than 400, she rejects 17% (3/18) of those equal to 400, and she accepts all ten offers exceeding 400. Table 12 ). At first blush, it might appear that B is showing some reciprocity towards A H when she reveals. However, in the baseline 62% of B's screening offers equal or exceed 100 -the equivalent of O L D + v -with 35% exceeding 100. In the treatment when player A does not reveal her type, the corresponding percentages are 64% and 37%. So the "reciprocity" that B shows when A H reveals is arguably just the generosity he exhibits towards A L , i.e., he provides no apparent compensation per se to A H for incurring costly disclosure. Thus, there is some evidence of a degree of fairness in the treatment of all player types, but no 30 A Spearman rank-sum correlation test (n =5) relating the decline in the dispute rate (difference between Table 8 and Table 12 dispute rates) to the frequency of disclosure by A H ( compensates her for the cost of disclosure v, and if she does not receive this amount, she will reject the offer with a high probability.
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Conclusion
We conduct an experiment designed to study the effect costly disclosure on the incidence of dispute. Our plaintiff (player A) has the option of revealing to an uninformed defendant (player B) whether she has a strong case (A H ) or a weak case (A L ). The performance of the theory is mixed. The theoretical prediction is that no player will make a costly voluntary disclosure in the screening game. Player A L reveals her type only 16% of the time, so this is largely consistent with the theory. Player A H 's deviation from theory is larger, as she reveals her type 42% of the 31 In a setting with symmetric information, Pecorino and Van Boening (2010) find that B players offer weak and strong plaintiff types a very similar portion of the surplus from settlement. This is consistent with our finding here that when A H reveals her information she receives an amount of surplus similar to that offered to A L via a sorting offer. Since no additional amount beyond this is offered, there is no evidence of reciprocity in our setting.
time. When A H discloses her type, we obtain a large (average 62-percentage point) reduction in the dispute rate, while the A L dispute rate is largely unaffected by her decision to reveal.
In our baseline with no disclosure opportunity and in our treatment when player A chooses not to reveal her type, player B shows some generosity from the perspective of A L , as his typical screening offer contains about 1/6-1/4 of the surplus from settlement. When A H reveals her type, the frequency with which she sees offers containing the same amount of surplus is largely identical to the amounts in the offers from the baseline, which are designed to be acceptable to A L players. That is, relative to the generosity B is (apparently) predisposed to show towards all A players, he rarely shows any additional reciprocity to A H for revealing her type, even though this costly action can help B to avoid costly disputes.
However, the surplus contained in a "fair" offer is enough to approximately compensate A H for her costs of disclosure. In rounds 7-end of the experiment, the return from disclosure is approximately zero. Viewed in this light, the 42% disclosure rate among A H players is not a great puzzle. This underscores a potentially important role for fairness in the analysis of the model we presented. On one level, fairness appears to play a small role in our experiment as the typical offer contains only about 1/6-1/4 of the joint surplus from settlement, but this level of fairness behavior appears to be important in explaining why A H sometimes engage in a costly revelation of private information when she is otherwise predicted not to do so. On the other hand, we observe very little evidence of reciprocity in this experiment. 32 When A H engages in costly disclosure, the proposer offers about the same surplus to A H as he does in the baseline or to players who do not reveal their type.
32 Obviously this does not in any way negate previous findings that reciprocity frequently occurs and is an important phenomenon. It merely implies that in the context of our experiment, reciprocity does not appear to be a major factor above and beyond the fairness concerns that we otherwise observe.
